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Spiess: NEA

WHAT'S WRONG WITH THIS PICTURE?: THE
NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS AND
THE "DECENY AND RESPECT" STANDARD
"Certainly one could make a strange menagerie with all the
professionals of art and their kindred spirits."I

Paul C6zanne, Artist (1839-1906)
I. INTRODUCTION

C6zanne, frustrated with a fellow painter's formalistic and
seemingly unsuccessful approach to the creative process, made
this statement in 1906, in criticism of the traditional art schools
and critics of his day.'

Perhaps Cezanne would have applauded when Congress gave
the National Endowment for the Arts [hereinafter "NEA"] the
authority "to establish and carry out a program of... grants-inaid . . . to . . . individuals of exceptional talent engaged in or
concerned with the arts,"' in order "to support a diverse array of

CtZANNE-FATHER OF 20TH-CENTURY ART 145
MICHAEL HOo,
(1994). In 1866, Czanne wrote a letter to the Director of Fine Arts in
response to the rejection of his paintings by the Official Salon, stating:
I wish to appeal to the public and show pictures in spite of
their being rejected [by the official Salon]. My desire does
not seem to me to be extravagant, and if you were to ask all
the painters in my position, they would reply without
exception that they disown the [judges] and that they wish to
take part in one way or another in an exhibition that should
as a matter of course be open to every serious worker.
Id. at 142.
It is also of interest to note that C6zanne abandoned his legal studies in
1860 to pursue his career as an artist. Id. at 20-21 (stating "I would want...
to risk all to gain all, and not hesitate any longer between two such different
choices for my future, between art and the law.").
2 Id. at 143.
' National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Act of 1965, 20
U.S.C. § 954(c) (1994).
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artistic expression" 4 and "to help create and sustain.., a climate

encouraging freedom of thought, imagination, and inquiry."I
C6zanne may have been less impressed, however, with other
aspects of this Congressional mandate. Congress directed the
NEA to avoid "'[c]onformity for its own sake"' 6 and to make
sure that "no undue preference . . . be given to any particular
style or school of thought or expression." 7 In addition, when
making determinations of eligibility for grants-in-aid, the NEA
Chairperson was required to take into account "artistic excellence
and artistic merit," as well as "general standards of decency and
respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American
public."' 8

By requiring the Chairperson to consider values

unrelated to artistic merit, Congress placed the statute at
constitutional loggerheads with the freedom of speech doctrine. 9

' Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671, 682 (9th
Cir. 1996), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998) (finding that "[e]ven the most
cursory reading of the NEA's enabling statute reveals this intent.").
5 20 U.S.C. § 951(7) (1994). This section states in pertinent part:
The practice of art and the study of the humanities require
constant dedication and devotion. While no government can
call a great artist or scholar into existence, it is necessary and
appropriate for the Federal Government to help create and
sustain not only a climate encouraging freedom of thought,
imagination, and inquiry but also the material conditions
facilitating the release of this creative talent.
Id.
6 Finley, 100 F.3d at 682 (quoting S. REP. No. 89-300, at 4 (1965)).
Id. The Finley court also cites Congress' reaffirmation of this intent in
adopting the 1985 amendments to the NEA's enabling statute. Id. These
amendments encourage the NEA to be "'more responsive to funding programs
that represent the many traditions in our heritage and the full cultural diversity
of our citizens . . .. [The [funded] programs should be open and richly
diverse, reflecting the ferment of ideas which has always made this Nation
strong and free.'" Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 99-194, at 13 (1985),reprinted
in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1055, 1058)).
8
20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (1994).
9 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press." Id.
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In Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 10 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit resolved this tension
and held that the "'decency and respect"' provision of §
954(d)(1) [hereinafter the "Act"] was "void for vagueness.""
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision and
held that the "decency and respect" provision of the Act did not
"introduce considerations that, in practice, would effectively

preclude or punish the expression of particular views" ,2because
such considerations inherently "do not engender the kinds of
directed viewpoint discrimination" that would be necessary to
hold the Act unconstitutional on its face. 3
Justice Souter, writing for the dissent, stated that "a statute
disfavoring speech that fails to respect America's 'diverse beliefs
and values' is the very model of viewpoint discrimination; it
penalizes any view disrespectful to any belief or value espoused
by someone in the American populace."'
It is the objective of this Comment to look at whether the
"decency and respect"15 provision of the Act violates the First and
Fifth Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and due
process of law on the basis of viewpoint discrimination and
100 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1996).
" Id. at 683 n.24 (finding that the government had failed to meet the strict
scrutiny test as no compelling state interest had been served by the statute).
12 Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2177
(1998).
10

13

Id. at 2176.

Id. at 2187 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671, 680 (9th
Cir. 1996) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (1994)). The court cautioned that
although the NEA decision makers have expertise in judging merit and
excellence in the artistic sphere, "they have no corresponding expertise in
applying such free-floating concepts as 'decency' and 'respect.'" Id. n. 18.
The court noted that there was testimony by then-NEA Chairperson Frank
Hodsoll stating "'I don't see any way for a Federal panel ... expert in the
arts, not expert in community standards . . . to make determinations for the
entire Nation as to what is acceptable or what is not going to be patently
Id. (quoting Reauthorization of Found. on the Arts and
offensive.'"
Humanities Act of 1965: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Select Educ. &
the Subcomm. on Post-secondary Educ. of the Comm. on Educ. and Labor.
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 552 (1985)).
14

15
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vagueness. The author's analysis will incorporate the reasoning

behind the Finley decision and illustrate how the First
Amendment prohibitions concerning content and viewpoint based
restrictions provide alternate grounds for striking down this
provision. Finally, this Comment will postulate that the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Finley v. National Endowment for the

Arts 6 appears to be a heavy-handed attempt to limit First
Amendment protection in the context of government funded
artistic expression.
II. DECENCY AND RESPECT: BY WHOSE STANDARD?
A. Void for Vagueness
The void for vagueness doctrine 7 imposes "special judicial
strictness" when analyzing statutory language that regulates
certain constitutional guarantees including the "freedoms of
speech, assembly, or association," in an attempt to prevent any

16

118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998).

17 THE

FEDERALIST

No.

78,

at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton

Rossiter ed., 1961). The concern for statutory vagueness surfaced at the
beginning of our country's constitutional history. As early as 1787, Alexander
Hamilton, anticipating the difficulties that might be encountered when statutory
vagueness impedes constitutional guarantees, wrote:
[T]he courts were designed to be the intermediate body
between the people and the legislature in order, among other
things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their
authority. The interpretation of the laws is the proper and
peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact,
and must be regarded by the judges as, a fundamental law. It
therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning as well as
the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the
legislative body.
If there should happen to be an
irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has the
superior obligation and validity, ought . . . to be preferred;
or, in other words, the Constitution ought to preferred to the
statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their
agents.
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statutory vagueness. 8 The doctrine requires that persons be
placed "on notice as to precisely what activity is made criminal
when. . . the activity distinguishes between criminal activity and
an activity which constitutes a fundamental constitutional right." 19
In addition, when regulating in the area of free speech, the
guidelines for enforcement must be clear and the regulation "must
be drawn with narrow specificity" so as to clearly indicate the
legislature's intent.m
Finley2' involved a group of performing artists whose NEA
grant applications had been rejected under the Act for failing to
meet the requisite decency and respect standards.2 The court
determined that the "decency and respect" provision of the Act
was void for vagueness under the Fifth Amendment, in addition
to being impermissibly restrictive of the artists' First Amendment
rights. 2
The Finley court, utilizing the principles of due process, found
that the statute was vague and thus void because it failed to
provide fair notice and explicit standards in its application." The
18

4 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NowVAK,

CONsTrruTIoNAL LAW
19 Id.

TREATIsE ON

§ 20.9 (2d ed. 1992).

I Id. (further citations omitted).
21 100 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1996).
22 Finley, 100 F.3d at 674. The language of the statute, as amended in
1990, reads in pertinent part:
No payment shall be made under this section except upon
application therefor which is submitted to the National
Endowment for the Arts in accordance with regulations
issued and procedures established by the Chairperson. In
establishing such regulations and procedures, the
Chairperson shall ensure that(1) artistic excellence and artistic merit are the criteria by
which applications are judged, taking into consideration
general standards of decency and respect for the diverse
beliefs and values of the American public ..
20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (1994).
2
Finley, 100 F.3d at 683-84. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "No person shall ...be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without

due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
24

Finley, 100 F.3d at 675.
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court stated that "[t]he twin dangers of a vague law--lack of
notice and arbitrary or discriminatory application--may chill the
exercise of important constitutional rights."2
In its analysis, the court looked for guidance to the precedent
established in Grayned v. City of Rockford. 6 In Grayned, the

Supreme Court upheld an antinoise ordinance that prohibited
persons on grounds adjacent to school buildings during school
hours from willfully making noises or diversions that might
disturb classes.27

The plaintiff contended that the law was

unconstitutional because it was both vague and overbroad.28 The
Court reasoned that a statute is "void for vagueness if its
prohibitions are not clearly defined," 29 since an individual must
be made aware of the prohibited conduct in order to avoid it. 3"
The Court stated that:
[I]f arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be
prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those
who apply them." A vague law impermissibly delegates
basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for
resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the
attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory
2
application.1
In considering the consequence of a vague statute on First
Amendment guarantees, the Court cautioned that it would
"'inhibit the exercise of [individual] freedoms,"' 33 because
25
26

Id.

408 U.S. 104 (1972).

Id. at 108 (further citations omitted).
id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
3' Id. n.4 (further citations omitted).
32 Id. at 108-09 n.5 (further citations omitted).
33 Id. at 109 n.7 (citing Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S.
278, 287 (1961)). In Cramp, the Court struck down a Florida statute that
required schoolteachers to execute a written oath disavowing any affiliation,
27
28

allegiance, or influence to the Communist Party, or face immediate discharge
from public service. Cramp, 368 U.S. at 287-88 (1961). The Court
determined that the statute was unconstitutionally vague on due process
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"[u]ncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to 'steer far wider
than if the boundaries of the forbidden
of the unlawful zone'
areas were clearly marked."34
The Court found, in Grayned, that the city of Rockford's
announced purpose in the antinoise statute's preamble was
"written specifically for the school context" 3 and gave "fair

notice to those to whom (it) [was] directed." -6 The Court
determined that the statute did not punish an unpopular position
and did not contain a "broad invitation to subjective or
discriminatory enforcement." 37
The Ninth Circuit in Finley found that the Act did not meet the
Grayned standard and noted that "courts apply a heightened
vagueness standard to a law that could deter protected speech
because of its uncertain meaning."" The court rejected the
grounds. Id. at 287. The Court stated "'a statute which either forbids or
requires that doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application, violates the first essential of due process of law.'" Id. at 280
(quoting Connally v. General Construc. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
3 Id. n.8 (citing Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964)) (further
citations omitted). The Court, in Baggett, declared a Washington statute,
requiring state employees and teachers to take a loyalty oath or face dismissal,
unconstitutionally vague. Baggett, 377 U.S. at 371-72. The Court held,
"[w]e are dealing with indefinite statutes whose terms, even narrowly
construed, abut upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms." Id.
at 372.
31 Id. at 112.
31 Id. n.21 (quoting American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S.
382, 412 (1950)), reh'g denied, 339 U.S. 990 (1950).
31 Id. at 113. The Court found that the City of Rockford did not purport
to punish those individuals responsible for all noises or diversions. Id. n.23
(further citations omitted). The fleshing out of the terms noise and diversion
were predicated by the ordinance's requirement that the noise or diversion be
"incompatible with normal school activity;" that there be a causal relationship
between the "noise or diversion" and the subsequent disruption that ensues.
and that there be a willful intention to commit these acts. Id. at 113-14.
38 Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671, 675 (9th
Cir. 1996) (citing N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963)
(further citations omitted)). The Court, in N.A.A.C.P., noted that "standards
of permissible statutory vagueness are strict in the area of free expression ..
Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive,
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NEA's argument that the vagueness of the "decency and respect"
provision was not in issue39 because it was "merely an elective
standard" to be employed when judging grant applications.40
According to the NEA's construction of the statute, the sole
criteria employed in the- grant approval process was "'artistic
excellence and artistic merit.'"'

The NEA also contended that,

since funding decisions were made by the Chairperson in
conjunction with advisory panels who reflected general standards
of "decency" and were able to "respect" the "diverse beliefs and
values of the American public," Congressional concern as to
42
"decency and respect" had already been satisfied.
The court faulted the NEA's reliance on Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.43 for deferring to the
NEA's interpretation of the statutory mandate.44 The Finley court
stated that the NEA's interpretation of the Act allowing the
Chairperson "to rely upon greater diversity in advisory panel
membership in lieu of a change in the criteria for judging grant
applications" was neither a "permissible" or "reasonable" one
and thus deference was not required.4 5 The issue of statutory
construction in Finley, however, was quite distinguishable from
the issue that confronted the Supreme Court in Chevron.
In Chevron, the Court addressed the issue of whether national
air quality standards promulgated by the Environmental
Protection Agency [hereinafter "EPA"], permitting the States a
government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity."
N.A.A.C.P., 371 U.S. at 432-33.
39 Finley, 100 F.3d at 676.
40

41

Id.
Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (1994)).

Id. at 676. The statute states that the Chairperson must:
[I]ssue regulations and establish procedures . . . to ensure
that all panels are composed, to the extent practicable, of
individuals reflecting a wide geographic, ethnic, and minority
representation as well as individuals reflecting diverse artistic
and cultural points of view ...
20 U.S.C. § 959(c)(1) (1994).
43 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
44 Finley, 100 F.3d at 677.
41 Id. (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-45).
42
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somewhat universal definition of the term "'stationary source'"
for certain industry groupings of pollution-emitting devices, were
founded on a reasonable construction of the term.' 6 The Court

noted that two questions must be addressed when reviewing an
agency's determination of a reasonable "construction of the
statute which it administers." 7
The first question is whether the intent of Congress is clear.'"

If the legislative intent is unambiguous then the matter is at an
end. 49 However, if legislative intent is unclear, the second
question for consideration is whether the agency's interpretation
of the statute in the administration of its duties is one founded on

a permissible construction.5
The Court acknowledged that if Congress has explicitly left a

gap for an agency to fill, it might clarify a specific statutory
provision by promulgating a regulation. 5 The Court noted that
these regulations "are given controlling weight unless they are
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute."n If
the legislative delegation to any agency on a specific issue is

implied rather than express a court may not insert its own

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840 (further citation omitted) (stating in pertinent
part "'[s]tationary source' means any building, structure, facility, or
installation which emits or may emit any air pollutant subject to regulation
under the Act.").
' Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
48 Id. at 842. The Court stated that:
The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory
construction and must reject administrative constructions
which are contrary to clear congressional intent. . .. If a
court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction,
ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise
question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given
effect.
Id. at 843 n.9 (internal citations omitted).
49 Id. at 842-43.
50 Id. at 843.
51 Id. at 843-44.
52 Id. at 844.
46
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construction of the provision for a reasonable interpretation
articulated by the administrator of an agency."
The Chevron Court, in its review of the EPA's varying
interpretations of the word "source" during the administration of
the statute, found the EPA to have "consistently interpreted
[source] flexibly--not in a sterile textual vacuum, but in the
context of implementing policy decisions in a technical and
complex arena."5 4

This flexibility, the Court reasoned, was

justified if an agency was "to engage in informed rulemaking;" 5
particularly if Congress has not indicated its disapproval of such
flexibility. 56 The Court asserted that "[w]hen a challenge to an
construction of a statutory provision, fairly
agency
conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency's
policy, rather than whether it [was] a reasonable choice within a
gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail." 57

53 Id. See Immigration & Naturalization Svc. v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S.
139 (1981). In Wang, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's
decision regarding the reopening of a Korean family's deportation proceeding
who were seeking to avoid deportation under a statute which permitted the
Attorney General to suspend deportation based on, among other concerns, that
extreme hardship would result if deportation was successful. Id. at 144-46.
The Court found that the Ninth Circuit had inserted its own construction of
"extreme hardship," thus usurping the legislature's delegation of authority to
the Attorney General to construe "extreme hardship" as he deemed
appropriate. Id. at 144-45. The Court stated "the [Immigration and
Nationality] Act commits [the] definition

. . .

to the Attorney General and his

delegates, and their construction and application of this standard should not be
overturned by a reviewing court because it may prefer another interpretation of
the statute." Id. at 144; see also Train v. National Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 421 U.S. 60 (1975). In Train, the Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's
decision which had held that State of Georgia's plan for air quality control,
originally endorsed by the Environmental Protection Agency [hereinafter
"EPA"], should not have been accepted. Id. at 98-99. The Supreme Court
reviewed the statutory language and found that the EPA had acted properly
under its legislative mandate and that the Fifth Circuit had interjected its own
interpretation contrary to Congress' intent. Id. at 87.
54 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863.
55

Id. at 864.

56

Id.

51

Id. at 866.
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Thus,

the court

in Finley objected

to

the NEA's

implementation of the standards of "decency and respect" in

judging grant applications when the agency instructs panel
members "to bring their own definitions of these terms 'to the
table' and make them 'part of the deliberative process.'" 3
In order to rectify vagueness, the NEA suggested the
Chairperson effectuate the statute in a certain manner. 9
However, the court determined that the NEA had "failed to

present a narrowing construction that [was] consistent with the
language and purpose of the statute"w and noted that it would not

rewrite a statute to make it constitutional. 61 Anticipating a
rejection of its suggestion, the NEA argued in the alternative that
the Chairperson could apply the decency and respect standards

for rejecting applications for projects that were considered

" Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671, 678 (9th
Cir. 1996) (quoting National Council on the Arts, 1990 Retreat 21 (1990)).
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. (quoting Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383,

397 (1988)). In American Booksellers, the Court certified two questions to the
Virginia Supreme Court which had held unconstitutional a Virginia statute
which prohibited commercial vendors from displaying sexually explicit
materials which were harmful to children. American Booksellers, 484 U.S. at
386. The Court held that these vendors had standing to bring such a suit
because, based on their interpretation of the statute, these individuals risked
criminal prosecution without "significant and costly compliance measures."
Id. at 392. The Court also held that the lower court's authoritative
interpretation of the statute greatly aided in rendering the statute
unconstitutional. Id. at 386; see also Heckler v. Matthews, 465 U.S. 728, 741
(1984) (further citations omitted) (noting "[t]he canon favoring constructions
of statutes to avoid constitutional questions does not . . . license a court to
usurp the policymaking and legislative functions of duly elected
representatives."). In Heckler, the Court upheld a provision of the Social
Security Act relating to the application of a pension offset, which affected
nondependent men, but not nondependent women who were similarly situated.

Heckler, 465 U.S. at 750. The Court reviewed the legislative history and
language of the Act and stated that "Congress meant to resurrect, for a five
year grace period, the gender based dependency test ...to prevent the serious
fiscal drain that. . . would result from payment of unreduced benefits ...
2
Id. at 742.
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The judiciary, however, has been cautious in its

treatment of the obscenity issue as illustrated by Bella Lewitzky
63
Dance Foundation v. Frohnmayer.

In Lewitzky, the court struck down an NEA mandate that
required applicants for grants to certify that the funds would not
be used to produce or promote artistic endeavors that might be
determined to be obscene.61 The court, relying on the vagueness

doctrine outlined in Grayned v. City of Rockford,6" ruled that the
NEA's certification requirement was unconstitutionally vague
because the determination of obscenity was left solely to the

agency. 6
The Lewitzky court also noted that the NEA was unable to

"cure" the statutory vagueness by relying on the obscenity
standards set forth in Miller v. California.67 The court held that

the NEA's reliance on Miller was faulty because the NEA is not
legally bound to rely on its own "policy statements" and was not
able to provide the necessary procedural safeguards delineated in

62

Finley, 100 F.3d at 678.

63

754 F. Supp. 774 (C.D. Cal. 1991).

Id. at 783.
Id. at 781-82; see also supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
6 Lewitzky, 754 F. Supp. at 781-82.
67 Id. (citing 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973),reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973)).
The Lewitzky court stated that:
Miller limited the scope of governmental regulation of
obscenity to works which depict or describe sexual
conduct.., specifically defined by the applicable state law,
as written or authoritatively construed, and established the
following basic guidelines for determining whether depictions
or descriptions of sexual conduct qualify as obscene:
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary
community standards would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . . (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by state law; and (c) whether the
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political or scientific value.
Id. at 781 n. 10 (internal citations quotations omitted).
64
61
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Miller.6s The safeguards referred to by the court are three in
number. 69
First, a statute must specifically define the conduct complained
of so that a possible transgressor "has 'fair notice' of what he can
and cannot do." 70 Second, the statute must provide for "a full
adversarial trial," 71 and "[third, there must be a jury able to
apply community standards for obscenity. "7 The court remained
unconvinced that the NEA would be able to apply each grantee's
particular community standard against that grantee's specific
funding request, even if it could apply the first two procedural
safeguards.73
In Finley, the court refused to extend the Millet3 ' standard to
the NEA's alternate interpretation of the reading of the Act.75
Instead, the Court held that "Congress adopted the 'decency and
respect' provision because it was broader and had a different
meaning than the provision prohibiting the funding of obscene
art."76 The court noted that:
The 'decency and respect' provision was enacted to prevent
the funding of particular types of art. To that end, it places
a mandatory duty on the Chairperson to ensure that grant
applications are judged according to 'general standards of
decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the
American public.' The Chairperson has no discretion to
6s Id. at 782.
69 Id.

Id. (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973), reh'g
denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973)).
71 Id. (citing Miller, 413 U.S. at 27).
72 Id. (citing Miller, 413 U.S. at 31-35).
73 Id. (quoting Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 58-59 (1967)) (noting
that since the NEA is a national agency, "grantees might only 'speculat[e] at
their peril'" concerning its application of local community standards").
I See supra notes 63 and accompanying text.
75 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (1994).
76 Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671, 678 (9th
Cir. 1996) (further citation omitted). The Finley court noted that the "'[t]he
term 'determined to be obscene' means determined, in a final judgment of a
court of record and of competent jurisdiction in the United States, to be
obscene." Id. at 678 n.13 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 952(j) (1994)).
70
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ignore this obligation, enforce only part of it, or give it a
cramped construction.'
The court continued to assail the "decency and respect"
provision of the Act as violative of the Fifth Amendment's due
process guarantees becaiise the standard of conduct was not
specified.78 The court saw the construction of the terms "decency
and respect" as an invitation to a guessing game for persons "'of
common intelligence,"' 7 9 noting that the interpretation of these
terms would vary from person to person 0 because what might be
offensive to one individual might be "a work of art to another."'1
In addition, as to what constitutes the "'diverse beliefs and
values of the American public,' " the court found it difficult, if
not impossible, to ascertain the meaning of such a provision. 3
The court observed that, "individual members of a pluralistic
society, and particularly our own, have a great variety of beliefs
and values, largely unascertainable."4
Id. at 680.
Id. (quoting Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971)).
In Coates, the Court struck down, as unconstitutionally vague, a city ordinance
which required that "[i]f three or more people [met] together on a [public]
sidewalk . . . they must conduct themselves so as not to annoy any police
officer or other person who should happen to pass by." Coates, 402 U.S. at
614. The Court held the ordinance vague because "no standard of conduct
[was] specified at all." Id.
71 Finley, 100 F.3d at 680 (quoting Connally v. General Construc. Co.,
269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (further citation omitted)).
80 Id. (citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974)). The Smith
Court found that a Massachusetts statute, that prohibiting the misuse of the
American Flag in a "contemptuous" way, was void for vagueness under the
due process clause. Smith, 415 U.S. at 582. The Court remarked that "the
absence of any ascertainable standard [of conduct] for inclusion and exclusion
is precisely what offends the Due Process Clause." Id. at 578.
81 Id. (quoting Smith, 415 U.S. at 573 (further citation omitted)).
82 Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (1994)).
77
78

83

id.

" Id. (citing Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, 847 F.2d 502, 513 (9th Cir.
1988)). In Bullfrog, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the United States Information
Agency's [hereinafter "USIA"] regulations for the implementation of the
Beirut Treaty, a treaty whose goal was to facilitate the international circulation
of educational, scientific, and cultural audio-visual materials. Bullfrog, 847
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The court saw this provision as encouraging dangerous
applications that were arbitrary and discriminatory." Although
conceding that artists do not have a property right in the grants,,,
the court noted that government officials have the power to deny
an application funding if:
[The] application offends the officials' subjective beliefs
and values. Inevitably, [the] NEA's decision not to fund a
particular artist or project as indecent or disrespectful will
depend in part on who is judging the application and
whether that official agrees with the artist's point of view.
Under such a grant of authority, funding may be refused
because of the artist's political or social message or because
the art of the artist is too controversial. This danger is
especially pronounced because a vague statute effectively
shields decisions from review. Where First Amendment
liberties are at stake, such a grant of authority violates
fundamental principles of due process.81
B. The First Amendment Prohibitions: An Alternative Tactic
Although it could have concluded its discussion of the
constitutional deficiencies of the Act at this juncture," the court
continued its discussion, by examining two pivotal cases" which
F.2d at 503. The court held that the qualifying criteria for submission were
unconstitutionally vague as " [o]ne might... make some educated guesses as
to the meaning of these regulations, but one could never be confident that
USIA would agree." Id. at 513.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 675 n.4 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109
(1972) (citations omitted) (noting "[w]hile the artists do not have a property
right in the grants, they are protected by the due process clause from arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement of vague standards that 'abut upon sensitive
areas of basic First Amendment freedoms.'").

Id. at 681.
Id.
89 See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia,
515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) (citing Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S.
92, 92 (1972)) (noting "[i]t is axiomatic that the government may not regulate
87

88
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support viewpoint neutral approaches in the area of governmental
subsidies of speech. These cases, the court explained, illustrate
the role of the First Amendment proscriptions against content and
viewpoint discrimination, which provide a reciprocal rationale for
holding the provision unconstitutional. 9°
First, the court referred to Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors
of the University of Virginia.9'
The Supreme Court, in
Rosenberger, made a lengthy review of the bedrock principles
that "provide the framework forbidding the State from exercising
viewpoint discrimination. " 92 The Court found that a university
policy excluding the funding of a student publication with a
decidedly Christian viewpoint, but providing funding to all other
student publications, violated the Free Speech Clause. 93
speech based on its substantive content or the message it conveys."); see also
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
90 Finley, 100 F.3d at 681 (internal citation omitted). The Finley court
noted that "[a] rt is protected by the First Amendment." Id. n. 19 (citing Miller
v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973)).
91 515 U.S. 819 (1995).

2 Id. at 829. The Rosenberger Court surveyed a number of courts to
support its conclusion. Id. The Court noted government regulation may not
favor one speaker over another." Id. (citing City Council of Los Angeles v.
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984)). The Court extended this
reasoning by stating that "[d]iscrimination against speech because of its
message is presumed to be unconstitutional." Id. (citing Turner Broadcasting
Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 640-42 (1994)). The Court also stated
that "the government offends the First Amendment when it imposes financial
burdens on certain speakers based on the content of their expression," Id.
(citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115 (1991)), and explained that "[w]hen the government
targets not subject matter but particular views taken by speakers on a subject,
the violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant." Id. (citing
R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992)). The Court summarized its
survey by emphasizing that "[v]iewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious
form of content discrimination" and "lt]he government must abstain from
regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or
perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction." Id. (citing Perry
Ed. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)).
9 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 852 (noting that the university "discriminated
on the basis of the [publication's] religious viewpoint in violation of the Free
Speech Clause" since various "features of the [u]niversity's program--such as.
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The Court did not accept the university's distinction between

its funding policies, which relied on content, rather than
viewpoint determinations,94 and stated, "discrimination against
one set of views or ideas is but a subset or particular instance of
the more general phenomenon of content discrimination,"0
relying on Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
District96 in its decision.Y7
In Lamb's Chapel,9 the Center Moriches school district
opened its facilities to the public for "social, civic, and
recreational purposes." 91 The district then denied Lamb's
Chapel, a community evangelical church, access to the school
premises. 10° The Church sought access to the premises so that it
might show a film addressing family and child-rearing issues.' 0'
The subject matter of the film, the Court noted, was not one that
had been placed off limits by the School District to "any and all
speakers.""
• . the disbursement of funds directly to third-party vendors, the vigorous
nature of the forum at issue" convinced the Court "that providing such
assistance... would not carry the danger of impermissible use of public funds
to endorse [the publication's] religious message.").
94 Id. at 829-30 (citing Perry Ed. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educ. Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 46 (1983)) (noting "content discrimination, which may be permissible
if it preserves the purposes of [the] limited forum, and . . . viewpoint
discrimination, which is presumed impermissible when directed against speech
otherwise within the forum's limitations.").
95 Id. at 830-31 (citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992)).
The Court explained:
Vital First Amendment speech principles are at stake here.
The first danger to liberty lies in granting the State the power
to examine publications to determine whether or not they are
based on some ultimate idea and if so for the State to classify
them. The second, and corollary, danger is to speech from
the chilling of individual thought and expression.
Id. at 835.
96

508 U.S. 384 (1993).

9' Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 830-31.
9' 508 U.S. 384.
9 Id. at 391 (internal quotations omitted).
1o Id. at 387.
10,
Id. at 388-90.
,o2

Id. at 393.
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The Court concluded that there did not appear to be any
indication that the Church's application to show the film, "was,
or would have been, denied for any reason other than the fact that
03
the presentation would have been from a religious perspective." 1
In summation, the Court held "'that the First Amendment forbids
the government to regulate speech in ways that favor some
viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others.' 104
Next, the court in Finley looked to Rust v. Sullivan'05 as

illustrative of the viewpoint-neutral posture that government
funding of the arts must maintain,106 acknowledging, however,
that the presence of government subsidies "alters this framework
somewhat."' 07 The Supreme Court in Rust upheld Department of
Health and Human Services regulations which curtailed the ability
of Title X fund recipients to participate in activities advocating
abortion as a method of family planning. 108
Id. at 393-94. The Court emphatically stated that denial, for religious
reasons, was invalid. Id. at 394 (citing Cornelius v. N.A.A.C.P. Legal
Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)). In Cornelius, the
Court stated, "the government violates the First Amendment when it denies
access to a speaker solely to suppress the point of view he espouses on an
otherwise includible subject." Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806.
"oId. (quoting City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. 789, 804 (1984)).
103

105

500 U.S. 173 (1991).

Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671, 681-82 (9th
Cir. 1996) (quoting Rust, 500 U.S. at 200) (noting "[n]eutrality may be
required because the area is a 'traditional sphere of free expression'").
'"' Id. at 681. The court explained this proposition by stating that "[t]he
government [is able to] make content-based choices 'when it is the speaker or
when it enlists private entities to convey its own message.'" Id. (quoting
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S.
819, 833 (1995)).
108 Rust, 500 U.S. at 177-78 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1994)) (noting
"[n]one of the funds appropriated under this subchapter may be used in
programs where abortion is a method of family planning."). Title X of the
Public Health Service Act authorized the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, which at the time was Louis Sullivan, to "make grants to and enter
into contracts with public or nonprofit private entities to assist in the
establishment and operation of voluntary family planning projects which shall
offer a broad range of acceptable and effective family planning methods and
services." Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300(a) (1994)). The statute required that
106
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In a series of cases that preceded Rust, the Court consistently
upheld the government's choice "to subsidize one protected

right" without subsidizing its "analogous counterpart." 10

The

Court, in deciding Rust, looked to three of its recent decisions in
the government subsidy area, Maher v. Roe,"' Harris v.
McRae,' and Regan v. Taxation with Representation,"1 for
3

guidance.1

Beginning with Maher, the Court acknowledged that the States
are given a wider latitude in choosing among competing demands
for limited public funds"" 4and the "decision to provide any one of
these [health or social] services or not to provide them" is not
constitutionally guaranteed." ' The Court made note of the fact

that "the providing of a particular service [does not] require, as6 a
matter of federal constitutional law, the provision of another.""1
The next decision, Harris v. McRae,"7 determined that a state
was not required to reimburse patients for medically necessary
abortions should federal funds be unavailable." 8 The Court held
a "refusal to fund protected activit[ies], without more, cannot be
9 and
equated with the imposition of a 'penalty' on that activity," ",

the funds "be used only to support preventive family planning services,
population research, infertility services, and other related medical,
informational, and educational activities." Id. (quoting H. R. Conf. Rep. No.
91-1667, at 8 (1970)), reprintedin 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5068, 5081-82).
1o9Id. at 194 (further citations omitted).
110 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
1 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
112

461 U.S. 540 (1983).

113Rust,

500 U.S. at 193.
Maher, 432 U.S. at 479 (citing Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, the
Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61
VA. L. REv. 945, 998-1017 (1975)).
"I Id. at 481 (Burger, J.concurring). Justice Burger commented that a
State is not required to finance a non-therapeutic abortion just because it has
chosen to finance certain childbirth expenses. Id. at 482 (Burger, I..
concurring).
116 Id. (Burger, J. concurring) (explaining Connecticut's decision to fimance
certain childbirth expenses and not others was within constitutional bounds).
114

1"7448
118

U.S. 297 (1980).
Id. at 311.

"19

Id. at 316 n.19.
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that, "it simply does not follow that a woman's freedom of choice
carries with it a constitutional entitlement to the financial
resources to avail herself of the full range of protected
choices. "120

The third decision in this series, Regan v. Taxation with
Representation,' concerned Congress' decision to selectively
subsidize certain tax-exempt organizations.' 22 In Regan, the
Court determined that certain organizations qualified under
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954123 were

not entitled to use tax-exempt contributions for lobbying
purposes." The Court reasoned that "[a] legislature's decision
not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not
infringe that right and thus is not subject to strict scrutiny." 2I In
addition, the Court noted that it was "not irrational for Congress
to decide that, even though it will not subsidize substantial
lobbying by charities generally, it will subsidize lobbying by
veterans' organizations. "126
Finally, in Rust v. Sullivan, 27 the Court explained "when the
Government appropriates public funds to establish a program it is
entitled to define the limits of that program. ' 128 The Supreme
Court, however, further illuminated its holding by explaining that
"[t]his is not to suggest that funding by the Government, even
when coupled with the freedom of fund recipients to speak
outside the scope of the Government-funded project, is invariably
120

Id. at 316.

461 U.S. 540 (1983).
'22 Id. at 544.
" Id. at 542, n.1 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1995)) (granting
"exemption[s] to [c]orporations . . . organized and operated exclusively for
religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or
121

educational purposes

. . .

no part of the net earnings of which.

. .

is carrying

on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation").
124 Id. at 551.
'z

Id. at 549.

Id. at 550. The Court explained that tax exemptions and tax deductions
"are a form of subsidy that is administered through the tax system." Id. at
126

544.
127

121

500 U.S. 173 (1991)
Id. at 194.
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sufficient to justify Government control over the content of
expression."129 The Court went on to list government-subsidized
forums, such as Government-owned property open to the public
or a university, that would not tolerate the restriction of speech or
expression. 0
The Supreme Court, almost twenty years earlier, in Perry v.
Sinderman,13 held that a college professor's "lack of a contractual
or tenure right to re-employment, taken alone," was sufficient to
defend on First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds.' 32 Because
the non-renewal of the professor's contract was predicated on his
criticism of the college's administrative policies,' the Court
stated:
[E]ven though a person has no 'right' to a valuable
government benefit and even though the government may
deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are
some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It
may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes
his constitutionally protected interests-especially, his
interest in freedom of speech. For if the government could
deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally
protected speech or associations, his exercise of those
freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited.-'
THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
On November 26, 1997, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
to Finley v. NationalEndowmentfor the Arts'" to determine if the

Id. at 199.
Id. at 200 (further citations omitted).
131 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
132 Id. at 596.
3 Id. at 595.
134Id. at 597 (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958) (internal
quotations omitted)).
,31 Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671 (9th Cir.
1991), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 554 (U.S. Nov. 26, 1997) (No. 97-371).
129

131

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1999

21

Touro Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 2 [1999], Art. 21

TOURO LAWREVIEW

800 "

[Vol 15

Act violates the First and Fifth Amendment guarantees because it
is viewpoint-based and vague.
It was difficult to speculate on how the Court would treat this
matter since the Court's jurisprudence in the area of artistic
expression is "meager." 3 0 Although speech focusing on religious
or political content has been given "the highest level of judicial
scrutiny," 37 First Amendment guarantees for artistic endeavors

have developed "in a piecemeal and haphazard fashion." 13
The Supreme Court considered this issue in a limited fashion
by developing a three-prong obscenity standard set forth in Miller
v. California.319 The Court, in Miller, attempted to "delineate
work that may be properly subjected to state regulation." 4'
As mentioned previously, the recent holding by a federal
district court in Bella Lewitzky Dance Foundation v.
Frohnmayer,"4 which struck down the NEA's certification
requirement against producing or promoting works that may be
considered obscene because they "violate[ ] . .
Amendment rights by causing a chilling effect on . .
1

.
.

First
artistic

2

expression,'
was yet another foray into articulating a First
Amendment protection for artistic-based speech.'
Certainly, the Ninth Circuit in affirming the district court's
decision in Finley, 144 extrapolated the Rosenbergei 44 and Rust"6

Thomas P. Leff, The Arts: A Traditional Sphere of Free Expression?
First Amendment Implications of Government Funding to the Arts in the
Aftermath of Rust v. Sullivan, 45 AM. U. L. REv. 353, 392 (1995).
13 Id. n.253 (citation omitted).
131 Id. n.259
136

(citation omnitted).

13' 413

U.S. 15, 24 (1973), reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 15 (1973); see infra
note 63 and accompanying text.
140

Leff, supra note 130, at 393.

14" 754

F. Supp. 774 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
Id. at 783.
14' Leff, supra note 130, at 398 (further citation omitted).
'" Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d. 671, 671 (1996)
(stating "[w] e affirm, essentially for the reasons stated by the district court.").
141 Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515
U.S. 819 (1995).
142

146

Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
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holdings into the artistic arena, 7 by acknowledging the district
court's 'cogent' analysis,' 8 an analysis that noted that "[t]he right
of artists to challenge conventional wisdom and values is the
cornerstone of artistic ...
freedom. . .."I The lower court then

held that "the government funding of the arts is subject to the
"
constraints of the First Amendment. 150
However, the Supreme Court's consideration of the Act
seemingly negated its track record of holding that "'standards of
permissible statutory vagueness are strict in the area of free
expression." ' '5
The Court has held that "'[b]ecause First
Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive,
government may regulate in the area only with narrow
specificity.'"
On June 25, 1998, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded
the Ninth Circuit's holding that the "decency and respect"
provision of the Act' was viewpoint-based and vague under the
First Amendment.IM The Court reasoned that the provision was
"facially valid, as it neither inherently interferes with First
Amendment rights nor violates constitutional vagueness
principles." 15 The Court acknowledged that this provision was a
bipartisan compromise seeking to satisfy the proponents calling
for either the NEA's demise or, at the very least, reduction of its
147

Finley, 100 F.3d. at 681-82 (quoting Rust. 500 U.S. at 200) (noting

"[n]eutrality may be required because the area is a 'traditional sphere of free
expression'")). The Supreme Court explained that "a content-based restriction
on speech is... presumed to be unconstitutional." Id. (quoting Rosenberger,
515 U.S. at 828).
141

Id. at 682.

149 Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1475
(C.D. Cal. 1992).

'15Id.

151 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967) (quoting
N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963) (further citations

omitted)).
'

Id.

153

20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (1994).

'1' Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2170
(1998).

,5 Id. at 2172.
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funding. 56 However, the Court determined that the statutory
language was "merely to take 'decency and respect' into
consideration," since the legislative intent was not to preclude
speech but, rather, reform procedure. 5 ' For this reason, the
Supreme Court found *no real danger that the Act might
"compromise First Amendment values."' 8
Justice Souter, dissenting, stated "[t]he Court's conclusions
that the proviso is not viewpoint based, that it is not a regulation,
and that the NEA may permissibly engage in viewpoint based
discrimination, are all patently mistaken."'5 9 The dissent cites
Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors of the University of
Virginia'60 as controlling precedent noting that the "First
Amendment forbids decisions based on viewpoint popularity" and
that the Government as patron does not exempt itself from this

prohibition. 161
Justice Souter acknowledged the position that "artistic
excellence and artistic merit" are bpen standards which could lead
to grants that are awarded on criteria that are less than precise.'62
The chilling effect in those instances, Justice Souter noted, is
tolerable and distinguishable from the "decency and respect"
standards which are decidedly viewpoint based'63 and designed to
reject expressions that "[defy] our tastes, our beliefs, or our
values. "161

156

Id.

157 Id.
158

Id.

159Id.

16o515
161

at 2185 (Souter, J., dissenting).

U.S. 819 (1995); see supra notes 85, 88-91 and accompanying text.

Id. at 2193 (Souter, J., dissenting).

Id. at 2196, n.17 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter explains how artists relying
on NEA grants are often matched by private donors and failure to obtain such
a grant under the 'decency and respect' proviso creates a chilling effect on
artistic expression either to "trim their work to avoid anything likely to offend,
or refrain from seeking NEA funding altogether." Id. at 2195 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
162
163

"6Id. at 2190 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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CONCLUSION
When discussing the area of government funded artistic
expression, one can easily fall prey to subjective myopia' and
lose sight of the more important tenet of preserving an
individual's right to freedom of speech and expression. The
Supreme Court, in City of Lakewood v. PlainDealer Publishing
Co., 166 struck down a city ordinance that gave the mayor
unbridled authority for the placement of newspaper vending
machines.'6 The Court cautioned that:
[A] law or policy permitting communication in a certain
manner for some but not for others raises the specter of
content and viewpoint censorship. This danger is at its
zenith when the determination of who may speak and who
may not is left to the unbridled discretion of a government
official. ...

[W]e have often and uniformly held that such

statutes or policies impose censorship on the public or the
press, and hence are unconstitutional, because without
standards governing the exercise of discretion, a
government official may decide who may speak and who
may not based upon the content of the speech or the
viewpoint of the speaker.6
Congress, in creating the NEA, recognized that "[c]ountless
times in history artists and humanists who were vilified by their
contemporaries because of their innovations in style or mode of
expression have become prophets to a later age." 169 In homage to
this history and to nurture our future prophets, Congress
11 Having seen Karen Finley's work and the work of Bruce Nauman, who
has filed an amicus brief, I cannot subscribe to the content and presentation of
their efforts. However, I would not accept the censoring of their work based
on standards that have been held to be "viewpoint based and vague."
166 486 U.S. 750 (1988).
167 Id. at 771-72.
168

Id. at 763-64.

"6 Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1473
(C.D. Cal. 1992) (quoting S. REP. No. 89-300, at 3-4 (1965)).
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expressly stated that the intent of the act is to [was to] encourage
free inquiry and expression and to discourage conformity for its
own sake.170 The only standard that could serve, in deed honor
these principles, is the standard of "artistic and humanistic

excellence." 17'
Lillian M. Spiess*

170

id.

(emphasis added).
* The author wishes to express her sincere thanks to Professor Peter
Zablotsky, Touro Law Center, for his invaluable support, insight, and
guidance in the writing of this article. The author would also like to offer her
deepest gratitude to Patricia A. Rooney, Research Editor, Touro Law Review,
for her patience and assistance. Finally, this article is dedicated to the author's
parents, Frank and Lillian Callanan, as thanks for a lifetime of love and
support.
171 Id.
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